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Change and Response in Japan's International Economic 
Policy1 
The establishment of a liberal multilateral trading system 
in the postwar period presented opportunities for rapid 
economic growth for Japan, and for other countries in East 
Asia and the Pacific, including Australia. The strength of 
the American economy and American political leadership 
ensured, for almost a generation, economic and trade growth 
that provided the substantial underpinning for the Western 
economic and security alliance.2 The success of the liberal 
international economic system, the rise of Japan and Europe 
as major centres of economic power and its converse, the 
declining relative importance of North America in the world 
economy, bring new challenges to international trade and 
economic diplomacy. 
These challenges focus heavily upon Japan. 
Challenge for Japan's Trade Diplomacy 
While the United States remains the dominant global and 
strategic power, the relative decline of its economic power, 
and its own growing vulnerability to a more inter-linked 
international—system,have—meant—an erosion—of—its—'rule 
making' authority and capacity in the international economy 
and a period of rivalry and confusion among its Western 
allies about sharing the responsibilities for management of 
the international economic system.3 
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Japan is emerging as a new power with global reach. The 
world's second largest economy, the world's third largest 
trader, the world's largest capital exporter: Japan's role 
is pivotal in the restructuring of the regional and 
international economic system, as well as the political and 
strategic system of Asia and the Pacific. 
But there are genuine questions about whether Japan is up to 
the task of trade and economic policy leadership and to 
serving the role of protector and exemplar of a liberal and 
open international economic system. 
These questions are motivated by two concerns. The first 
relates to the nature of the international economic system 
itself, in a stage of significant change in the structure of 
world economic power. The second relates to the nature of 
Japan, its society, polity, institutional foundations, and 
driving policy motivations. 
This paper addresses the latter concern, albeit in the 
context of asking whether domestic processes would encourage 
or permit Japan to play an important role in protecting and 
developing the international economic system and how that 
role may realistically be played. Inevitably these 
questions prompt comment upon the same processes in the 
United States and their impact upon the international trade 
and economic system, not least because the conception of 
Japan's role in world economic affairs as being entirely 
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alien to support for an open and liberal international 
economic system is currently deeply rooted in American 
political thinking.4 That has to be explained; and I shall 
attempt to do so briefly. The respective roles of the 
United States and Japan also require comment. A specific 
interest, in the development of the argument, is how Japan 
has responded to the various proposals from the United 
States for free trade area solutions to trade policy 
problems, particularly to the proposal for a United States-
Japan Free Trade Area during the 1980s.5 
Hegemonic dominance? 
Before turning to these questions, has Japan's emergence as 
the world's second largest economic power, of its nature, 
been destabilising to the structure of the postwar 
international economic system? 
Clearly, in one key respect, the answer is no. The 
decoupling of economic from military power has made Japan's 
re-integration into the international community in the 
postwar period much less threatening than would have 
otherwise been the case. As Inoguchi and Okimoto point out, 
"Japan's ... conversion from military power to commercial 
state has not only neutralised the danger of Japan's own 
military recrudescence; it has also contributed to the 
stabilisation of East Asia, a region of chronic instability 
from the nineteenth through to the mid twentieth century."6 
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Now, let me dispatch the first concern: the question of 
hegemonic dominance as a requirement for system stability. 
As the economic power of the United States has begun to 
wane, and that of Japan and East Asia has grown, much of the 
commentary on the transfer of the responsibilities of 
international economic leadership around the decline of 
America's hegemonic power has been cast in terms of their 
transfer from one dominant hegemon to another. Nowhere is 
this perspective more entrenched in thinking that it is in 
discussion of the changing status of the United States and 
Japan. This is not the place to enquire into the political 
or, indeed, the psychological wellsprings of this view of 
the transfer of hegemonic power, but rather to note simply 
the limitations of intellectual analysis along these lines.7 
Obviously adjustment to economic change brings with it 
dislocation, conflict and uncertainties, all of which have 
accompanied Japan's rapid rise as a world economic power. 
From the perspective of the international economic system, 
an automatic, but inadvertent, side-effect of Japan's rise 
has been the relative decline of American economic power and 
hegemonic status. Orthodox theories of hegemonic stability, 
in the literature of international relations, suggest that 
Japan's economic ascendance is inevitably altering the 
distribution of economic power in a way that destabilises 
the international system, weakening the ability of the 
United States to maintain rules and policy behaviour 
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consistent with open trade and capital flows and an orderly 
international monetary and financial system. In this view, 
a fundamental requirement for system stability is hegemonic 
dominance. 
Suffice it to say that analysis which predicates system 
stability on the persistence of hegemonic dominance is built 
upon a very simple model. It neglects the complex 
relationship between economic power and the capacity to use 
it in determining policy outcomes;8 it neglects the 
incentive to coalition or alliance formation among principal 
or minor economic powers to preserve critical interests in 
the system; and, paradoxically, it neglects the rich 
complication of economic matters by political and security 
matters in the development of approaches to system 
maintenance, or the regime, as an object of international 
policy. 
This is not to say that hegemonic stability theorists may 
not, in the event, turn out to be right in their forecasts. 
They may; but if they are so, they will not be so because of 
the predictive power of orthodox theory. The point is that 
the emergence of Japan as a contending (or challenging) 
economic power implies nothing, in the nature of things, 
about system collapse. On the facts of this matter, the 
jury should still be out and concerned about more 
fundamental issues, to which I shall later turn. 
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Precept and Practice 
Trade policy leadership responsibilities obviously represent 
a political as well as an economic burden for which the 
recompense is only very indirect. They involve the effort 
of addressing the tough political problems at home 
(associated in Japan with freeing up agricultural trade, 
reducing support for small scale manufacturing and 
regulation of service industries, and liberalising national 
procurement arrangements)9 and of building up the 
credibility in the international community necessary to make 
it manageable.10 
Certainly, in respect of this last point, Japan's trade 
diplomacy cannot be said yet to enjoy a good international 
press.11 This is partly a product of where Japan's trade 
policies have come from, both in terms of precept and 
practice, and partly a product of where the international 
press comes from. What is reflected in the public press is 
also a prominent theme in the academic press, especially at 
its more popular end.12 
In the April 1989 issue of Harvard Business Review, Taggart 
Murphy13 bluntly states a view widely held in the United 
States: 
The world cannot confidently look to Japan as an 
impartial guarantor of an open trading system (p.143) 
. . . more likely is that Japan will continue to use its 
financial strength to further Japanese interests, which 
are not necessarily the same as the world's 
especially given Japan's seeming compulsion to dominate 
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every important value-added industry. The uncoupling 
of financial power and global vision could lead to a 
series of political, economic and financial crises like 
the run on Continental (Bank) or the stock market crash 
of October 1987 (p.144) ... Japan is reluctant to 
import manufactured goods from abroad, but more 
important, its compensation patterns and wealth 
distribution make it difficult for the country to take 
over as an engine of global demand (p.146). 
In the May 1989 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, James 
Fallows14 concludes: 
Unless Japan is contained, therefore, several things 
that matter to America will be jeopardised: America's 
own authority to carry out its foreign policy and 
advance its ideals, American citizens' future prospects 
within the world's most powerful business firms, and 
also the very system of free trade that America has 
helped to sustain since the Second World War. The 
major threat to the free trade system does not come 
from American protectionists. It comes from the 
example set by Japan. Japan and its acolytes, such as 
Taiwan and Korea, have demonstrated that in head-on 
industrial competition between free-trading societies 
and 'capitalist development states', the free traders 
will eventually lose. The drive to break up the world 
into trading blocs - united Europe, North America, East 
Asia - is largely fueled by other countries' desire to 
protect themselves against Japan. Even in their own 
inroads into the Japanese market, foreigners are 
tempted to settle for a small place in the dango . . . 
rather than pulling for truly open competition in 
Japan. The ideal of free trade retreats, as the states 
that do (not) really believe in it expand (p.54). 
These are hardly glowing testimonials for the pretender 
champion of the liberal international economic system! 
A principal text, for these and other publicists and 
politicians in the United States and elsewhere, is Chalmers 
Johnson's, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.15 More recently 
Karel van Wolferen's piece 'The Japan Problem' in Foreign 
Affairs16 and his book, The Enigma of Japanese Power,17 have 
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been embraced for their revelations about what van Wolferen 
himself unashamedly calls 'the Japanese System'.18 
Van Wolferen builds on Johnson's earlier analysis of the 
partnership between central bureaucrats and business in the 
'interventionist' promotion of the 'development state'.19 
While Johnson would now concede that various forms of 
governmental guidance carry less weight with the private 
sector than once they did (the sub-title of his book is The 
Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975)20, van Wolferen 
asserts that the partnership between state and private 
enterprise has an industrial policy and trade strategy which 
is directed towards 'industrial expansion not freedom of the 
market' (p.293.) and that this flourishing partnership is 
not likely to break up.21 
Another stream in thinking is reflected in Drucker's22 
notion that Japan engages in 'adversarial trade', 
characterised by targeted attacks on established industries 
abroad (especially in the high technology area) and dogged 
resistance to imports of high-value manufactured goods. 
This argument draws sustenance from theorising in the 
literature of international economics on the strategic trade 
policy implications of the presence of monopoly elements and 
economies of scale in international markets23 and is used to 
give credence to 'results-oriented, managed trade' policy 
over GATT-focused negotiations about trade and trade-related 
barriers and trade rules.24 
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The most disturbing manifestation of this is the approach to 
trade policy embodied in Section 301 (of the 1974 United 
States Trade Act).25 Now turned into Super 301, under 1988 
legislation, the Act required the United States Special 
Trade Representative to designate by 30 May foreign 
countries whose 'unfair' trading practices make them 
candidates for unilaterally imposed retaliation. Numerical 
targets were to be set, sector by sector, for the volume of 
American goods that foreign nations were be expected to buy. 
If they failed to reach that volume, the United States would 
retaliate.26 Although Trade Representative Hills declared 
she did not want to use her 'results-oriented, managed 
trade' powers27, the report by James D Robinson (American 
Express) and James R Houghton (Corning Glass), co-chairmen 
of the United States Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations, forcefully advocated import targeting and 
managed trade.28 
In the event, Japan (together with Brazil and India) was 
targeted under Super 301, although less drastically than 
expected, citing unfair practices in only three areas, super 
computers, satellites and forrest products. These issues 
are currently under negotiation between Japan and the United 
States.29 
Contrary to these perceptions, the reality is that Japan has 
among the cleanest of import systems for manufactured goods 
among all OECD countries; official non-tariff barriers have 
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almost no effect on trade at all. Yet the relatively low 
proportion of manufactured goods in Japanese imports, and 
low import penetration ratios in manufactured commodities of 
which other developed countries are major exporters, have in 
recent years led protectionist interests in North America, 
Europe and Australasia, and sometimes officials and 
independent commentators in those same countries, to 
postulate a major role for non-official barriers, perhaps 
with official sanction.30 Of course, Japan still has an 
agricultural sector which is among the most highly protected 
in the world, and Japanese agricultural protection increased 
rapidly (around the quantitative restrictions on trade) over 
the last two decades when Japanese commercial policy 
ostensibly pointed towards liberalisation. In this respect, 
Japan is only a front-runner among the industrial country 
pack. 
The evidence provided by careful studies of Japan's trade 
dependence and trade structure, such as those of Stern and 
Saxonhouse (1987)31 and Saxonhouse (1988a and 1988b),32 
suggests that there is no significant difference between 
Japan's trade structure and those of other industrial 
countries, when account is taken of cross-national 
differences in factor endowments, including capital, labour 
and a variety of natural resources. The contention that 
Japanese institutions, or reliance on a variety of informal 
barriers (or the 'Japanese System'), significantly influence 
the structure of trade cannot be supported on this evidence, 
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nor can 'a convincing case be made that Japan's trade and 
domestic policies are the root causes of the existing 
bilateral trade imbalances'.33 
In one recent study, Saxonhouse undertakes the illuminating 
simulation of examining what might happen to Japanese and 
United States trade structure if the United States were to 
give Alaska to Japan.34 The peculiar lack of change in 
Japan's non-energy imports between the early 1970s and early 
1980s vanishes and Japanese performance is virtually 
identical with the character of changes taking place in most 
European countries and in the United States. The ratio of 
manufactured goods imports., to GNP for Japan rises above the 
United States ratio. He further assumes that East Asia 
(other than Japan) has the same economic size as Europe. 
The ratio of manufactured imports to Japanese GNP rises to 
6.7 per cent, not significantly below European levels.35 
As Saxonhouse suggests,36 for many Japanese citizens, 
foreign complaints about lack of access to the Japanese 
market over the past decade must be little short of totally 
incomprehensible. They can patronise McDonald's or Kentucky 
Fried Chicken even at remote stops around the country. They 
may work at a company that uses an IBM mainframe computer 
and on weekends may drink Scotch whiskey or Coca-Cola, 
lounge in US designer jeans, and take their children to 
Tokyo Disneyland. In all these cases, domestic substitutes 
are available, but they will choose a foreign product or 
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foreign-licensed product. If they are a bit younger, an 
excursion to get geared up at Vivre 21 in downtown Kyoto 
will produce an entirely Korean, Chinese or European 
designer-made ensemble. Of course, at the same time, on the 
basis of a foreign trip, they will grumble at the high price 
of beef and other foodstuffs in Japan.37 
How does this Japan-side perception and the hard analytic 
evidence stack up against all the anecdotal evidence of 
street-wise American journalists, businessmen and 
politicians? 
As Saxonhouse acknowledges,38 the best-known and most 
influential anecdote is that told by Lionel Olmer, former 
United States under-secretary of commerce for international 
trade. While employed by Motorola, Olmer attempted to sell 
high-quality, inexpensive pager phones to Nihon Telephone 
and Telegraphic (NTT). Despite offering a phone that was 
qualitatively identical to that supplied by NTT's affiliate 
NEC, at a very competitive price, it took years for Olmer's 
company to conclude a sale. This, Saxonhouse concedes, is a 
good story. There are others in Prestowitz's book Trading 
Places.39 But it is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon.40 It 
similarly took many years for German and Japanese steel 
producers to sell their cheaper steel to General Motors in 
the United States. As Cooper's study of North American 
metals markets in the 1970s shows, the lagged response to 
relative price change is widespread.41 
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It is true that Japanese corporate and distribution systems 
contain powerful conservative bias, delaying the emergence 
of large scale imports beyond the time when they appear to 
have become competitive. Such biases are not unique ±n 
Japan.42 Moreover, the evidence since the appreciation of 
the yen in 1985 suggests thai:, despite the lags, the normal 
competitive pressures operate for Japan. Japan's imports of 
manufactured goods from Asian, developing countries have been 
increasing at more than 50 per cent per annum since 1985. 
The share of manufactures in Japanese total imports has also 
been increasing rapidly over this period, although not so 
strongly from the United Si:ates as from other suppliers.43 
The moral of this story is, perhaps, that if you spend too 
much time reading dated scholarly tracts and writing books, 
you end up in Ripp van Wolferen-Land! 
But what has produced this perception gap between the United 
States, other countries and Japan and where is it leading? 
United States-Japan Problem 
Heightened tension in the management of the United States 
and Japan relationship in the first half of the 1980s 
resulted mainly from the impact of macroeconomic policies in 
both countries and the lack of effective macroeconomic 
policy coordination. This was a recurrent problem from the 
late 1960s but extreme imbalance, focused on rising United 
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States current account deficits and Japanese surpluses, 
emerged very rapidly between 1980 and 1985. An American 
current account surplus of US$6 billion in 1981 had been 
transformed into a deficit of US$141 billion by 1986, a 
deficit amounting to 3.3 per cent of American GNP. A 
Japanese current account surplus of US$4 billion in 1981 had 
grown to US$86 billion in 1986, running at 4.2 per cent of 
Japanese GNP.44 The dramatic turnaround in international 
payments coincided with Japan's arrival at great economic 
power status. 
While the basic causes of each country's problem were 
separate and domestic, Japan's current account surplus 
became a symbol to many Americans of the foreign source of 
America's trade imbalance problem. Japan's surplus and the 
American deficit were not significantly a consequence of 
either Japan's 'closed economy' (as many American 
commentators insisted) or America's 'lack of 
competitiveness' (a popular view in Japan).45 They were 
mainly the products of extremely high savings and low 
government spending in Japan and high government expenditure 
and a strong dollar in the United States in the first half 
of the 1980s. The sharp contraction of Japanese government 
expenditure in the early 1980s and capital market 
liberalisation saw Japan emerge as the world's largest 
capital exporter, and coincidentally, a primary funder of 
America's high expenditure (and low rate of saving) in the 
first half of this decade. Japanese capital market 
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liberalisation provided the avenue for Japan to finance the 
growth of American debt.46 As the range of American 
financial and other assets acquired by Japanese 
institutions, corporations and individuals has broadened, 
American anxieties about Japan's economic power have 
multiplied. 
Liberalisation of Japan's trade barriers is an important 
objective in itself (for Japan and now for the health of the 
liberal trading system), but it would have made little 
difference to Japan's bilateral surplus on current account 
with the United States at this time if all Japan's trade 
barriers had been removed immediately. During the period of 
rising current account surpluses, Japan's protection was 
falling. Elimination of Japan's trade barriers would have 
led, it has been estimated, to a US$5-8 billion expansion of 
American exports at most (Bergsten and Cline, 1987).47 The 
main adjustments for both Japan and the United States had 
therefore to be on the macroeconomic front, and these 
adjustments, set in train rather belatedly after the Plaza 
Agreement of September 1985, forced the pace through the 
large exchange rate shift. The macroeconomic adjustment in 
the United States still has a long way to go. Furthermore, 
the adjustment in Japan will not eliminate Japan's current 
account surpluses. The circumstance of large Japanese 
savings (current account surpluses and capital outflow) will 
persist for at least a decade or more. Hence, while the 
direction of adjustment in the structure of trans-Pacific 
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payments imbalances should relieve some of the pressures, 
considerable dangers remain along the path of adjustment. 
Elsewhere48 I have suggested that the main danger arises 
because both countries are diverted into attempts to resolve 
their global trade imbalances by action directed at each 
other (both negative and positive action: specific 
restrictions or surcharges and bilateral market access 
arrangements). In the conduct of the United States-Japan 
relationship, specific trade issues come to dominate the 
policy approach. Resolving these issues one by one has the 
cumulative effect of aggravating American perceptions of 
Japanese intransigence and unreasonableness and Japanese 
perception of American scape-goating. The pattern involves 
Japanese procrastination on specific issues, American or 
foreign pressure (gaiatsu), mobilisation of American 
pressure to shift positions in Japan,49 heightened American 
frustration, politicisation of the problem in America, and 
the lesson that Japan will respond if hit hard. 
A related and important danger, for Japan's other trading 
partners, is that Japan-.targeting by the United States and 
the American obsession in Japan leads both parties into 
negotiating bilateral deals damaging to third parties as 
well as the whole trading system. 
Bigemonic Solution 
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The idea, with which former United States Ambassador to 
Japan, Mike Mansfield, was associated, of a United States-
Japan free trade area, was in part directed at providing a 
safety valve to head off the continuing pressures in the 
United States-Japan relationship.50 It also fell, however, 
within a class of proposals which the United States floated 
in the lead-up to launching the new GATT Round, when the 
United States shifted towards a trade diplomacy based on the 
conditional most-favoured-nation approach, seeking 'free 
trade area solutions' to its trade policy problems. The 
agreement with Israel and- the negotiation of a free trade 
arrangement with Canada were important targets in this 
policy approach (as well as the much-heralded Caribbean free 
trade arrangement). There were also suggestions at this 
time for some sort of 'free trade area' association between 
the United States and Western Pacific countries (ASEAN, 
Australia and others).51 On the face of it, it seems that 
not all these United States suggestions were aimed at 
setting up 'free trade areas' as such; rather they were 
aimed at establishing a dealing mechanism between the United 
States and certain Western Pacific countries, separately 
from or together with Japan. 
Similarly, Mansfield declared that his proposal had as a 
primary interest giving impetus to a successful GATT 
Round.52 Its major motivation, however, was bilateral and 
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political; stemming from '... the belief that the (United 
States) should switch from approaches which politicise trade 
issues, exacerbate friction, raise emotional stakes, erode 
public support (in Japan) for American objectives and risk 
undermining both countries' commitment to the alliance.53 
While Mansfield's conception of a United States-Japan 
agreement is potentially consistent with the nature of a 
joint commitment by both economic powers to the 
establishment of a core area for free trade and global 
policy interests, exploration of the idea explicitly 
involved consideration of the effects of exclusion on third 
parties in Asia and Europe,54 and the American politics of 
the idea made little sense except in terms of Japan's 
yielding specific concessions to the United States. 
Significantly, Mansfield's bold attempt to capture the 
American protectionists for the free trade cause through his 
'free trade area' proposal engaged the early support of 
Senators Gephardt, Baucus and Byrd, as well as the interest 
and attention of Brzezinski and Kissinger. 
Mansfield's objectives .may have been laudable, but the 
limitations of his proposal in dealing with the trade and 
other dimensions of tensions in the United States-Japan 
relationship were serious. While large gains would 
certainly flow from genuine and comprehensive freeing of 
trade and service transactions - including removal of 
pervasive Voluntary Export Restrictions (VER) in the United 
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States and service trade barriers in Japan - between the 
world's two largest economies, the chances of negotiating 
such an exchange of concessions on a non-exclusive (or most-
favoured-nation) basis, so that the benefits would be open 
to all third parties, are minimal. This is readily-
acknowledged in the United States International Trade 
Commission's review of the proposal.55 Moreover, the 
likelihood of an exclusive traditional-style free trade 
arrangement's being subject to important exemptions, thus 
limiting gains to Japan, the United States and the world, is 
extremely high. 
The reality of free trade areas and customs unions in 
practice is that exceptions are important to the politics of 
their establishment, especially in the critical early years. 
Where they have not been, the establishment of the free 
trade area has been associated with increased barriers to 
trade with the rest of the world.56 This outcome is driven 
by an important asymmetry in the political economy of 
protection policy, between the highly focused opposition to 
trade creation by established interests in protected 
industries, together with the highly focused support of 
established interests in trade diversion, on the one hand, 
and the diffuse beneficiaries from trade creation on the 
other.57 
One would be blind to the realities of the political economy 
of protection to ignore the likelihood that, in a United 
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States-Japan free trade area, the process of negotiation and 
compromise would favour trade diversion over trade creation. 
It is precisely such realities that invested in the US-Japan 
proposal its political appeal in the United States. 
Yet, as many who gave evidence to the International Trade 
Commission investigation in the United States saw clearly, 
there would also be no guarantee of its relieving tension in 
the politics of managing the bilateral relationship.58 
Rather, such an initiative is likely to generate false 
expectations in America, raising the political stakes in the 
Japan relationship and compelling negotiators to reach a 
deal in neither the United States' nor anybody else's best 
interest.59 Nor would it eliminate the need to resort to 
pressure tactics, since it is impossible, in any polity, to 
resolve thorny trade issues, such as agriculture and 
construction in the case of Japan, without raising them to 
the highest political levels.60 
The policy approaches adopted by the United States and Japan 
towards each other are of systemic importance because the 
most important game-play in international trade diplomacy 
revolves around the management of the economic relationship 
between the United States and Japan. This is the most 
important relationship in the Pacific economy and among the 
most important in the world. 
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Their policy approaches are crucial as they are the 
maintainers or underminers of the GATT-based open 
international trading system, because of the impact of the 
resolution of their trade policy problems upon the rules of 
the trading system and upon trade policy behaviour more 
broadly. 
Certainly Japan's role in trade liberalisation and the 
negotiation of international settlements on other commercial 
policy, exchange rate and macroeconomic policy issues is a 
central element in international economic diplomacy, but it 
will only be supportive of broader Pacific and global 
objectives if it finally eschews the 'specific reciprocity' 
implied in the United States-Japan free trade area proposal 
and much of the thinking in the United States which 
advocates 'managed trade' policies as the only means whereby 
to deal with Japan. Japan's interests are broader. The 
importance of the East Asian and Western Pacific 
relationship, the growing significance of the relationship 
with Europe, the delicate development of interdependence 
with China, the .emergence of the Soviet bloc and the 
opportunity for the emergence of Vietnam and the DPRK from 
their past isolation are only some of the factors which 
extend Japan's 'third country' interests and commitments to 
the multilateral trade and economic system. 
It is instructive to observe how the Japanese policy process 
dealt with the United States-Japan free trade area proposal. 
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The first result was a significant diversion of policy 
resources into consideration of the Mansfield-Byrd idea. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) all set up 
task forces or study groups to evaluate the initiative.61 
Much policy energy, not only in Japan but throughout the 
East Asian and Pacific region, was engaged in the assessment 
of Japan's policy interests. Because of inter-agency 
jurisdictional interests, much of this effort was 
duplicative; its external effect was confusing in policy 
direction and, to some extent, draining of policy resources 
right around the region. 
Nevertheless, Japan's fundamental interest in a GATT-based, 
non-discriminatory approach to trade diplomacy emerged 
clearly and relatively soon, in response to the expression 
of third country concerns and, for example, the Hawke-
Takeshita initiative in establishing a joint study group of 
Japanese and Australian officials to review this and other 
policy proposals. It was also clear in the steady 
institutional and substantial commitment of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to multilateralist perspectives. Initially, 
MITI's stance was less certain, but the rhetoric soon 
shifted towards commitment to multilateral interests and 
'open regionalism', albeit with a particular emphasis on 
East Asian newly industrialising economies' and ASEAN's 
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trade and investment relationships with Japan as a 
counterpoint to North American influence.62 
Two other elements deserve note. Keidanren (the Federation 
of Economic Organisations) made clear its priority in 
putting more effort into making the Uruguay Round successful 
and to merchandise and service trade liberalisation on a 
global basis.63 The brief from which business leaders spoke 
called for total rejection of bigemonism (nikokushugi) on 
the grounds that it would reinforce regionalist and managed-
trade tendencies in international economic policy. Press 
and academic commentary was also overwhelmingly skeptical of 
this direction for Japan's- trade diplomacy. Kojima (of the 
Nikkei) and Funabashi (of the Asahi) in the press and the 
majority of influential academic commentators stressed the 
multilaterist, non-discriminatory interest in Japan's 
foreign trade diplomacy. 
In short, the image of Japan's trade policy philosophy that 
is revealed in this experience is not that which could be 
recognised easily from the descriptions in Murphy, Fallows 
or van Wolferen. Rather, there is considerable evidence 
here to support the conclusion of Komiya and Itoh that 'the 
dominant philosophy among Japan's economic policy 
authorities and the Japanese public has changed 
considerably' in the last two decades (post Chalmers 
Johnson) and certainly since the earlier postwar period. 
'The philosophy that free trade is basically the most 
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desirable policy for the Japanese economy has gained 
acceptance among policymakers, leading businessmen and 
knowledgeable people.64 At its institutional roots, MITI 
may well be full of interventionist/coordinator recidivists, 
but in its top policy councils, mercantilist thinking is in 
total retreat, if not entirely routed. Agricultural 
protection is under question and pressure, domestically. At 
the same time, Japan's regulation-oriented economic policy 
philosophy has been steadily evolving towards a free-
competitive, market-oriented philosophy. 
Reactive State Diplomacy 
Yet Japan's foreign trade diplomacy may seem to some a weak 
reed on which to rely in managing these important 
international economic policy problems. 
There are two reasons for this anxiety; one external to 
Japan and one internal to the nature of Japan's policy 
process, which has just been outlined through example. 
On the first front, clearly the problem for Japan and other 
countries in managing challenges to the liberal trading 
system is that large scale trade liberalisation in Japan, 
East Asia, or for that matter Europe, is incapable of 
contributing in a major way to curing United States 
imbalance problems. There is no reliable prospect for 
addressing current international tensions independently of 
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United States progress in moderating domestic demand, in the 
pursuit of more balance in current external payments. A 
broader dialogue on macroeconomic adjustment issues, not 
only between Japan and the United States, but also including 
their other partners in the Pacific, might be helpful to 
progress on that front.65 Yet the solution to America's 
macro-economic and external payments imbalance problems 
rests within the power of the United States alone; any 
positive incentive Super 301 and other such actions by the 
United States give to international trade liberalisation 
will not solve these problems.66 
On the second, let me finally turn directly to Japan's 
policy process and trade policy motivations. 
As Japan's centrality to the international economy has come 
to be more widely understood, Calder and Okimoto67 emphasise 
the point that both foreign and Japanese analysts have 
developed quite divergent conceptions of what Japanese 
foreign economic policies are and how they have come to be 
what they are. Some see Japanese policies as remarkably 
liberal in view o.£ Japan's pervasive resource 
vulnerabilities; others see the same policies as rapaciously 
mercantilist. 
These divergent perceptions are clearly partly in the eye of 
the beholder. It is also true, as Calder suggests, that 
views are limited by lack of serious Western and Japanese 
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scholarship on the character of the Japanese state in its 
complex relationship with the global economic system. While 
much good work in this area has been done by the new 
generation of Australian scholars - George, Rix, Home, 
Sheard, Lesbirel and Miller68 - the impact of their work and 
that of Calder and Okimoto in the United States is only now 
beginning to be felt on American scholarship.69 A key to 
reconciliation of much of the divergence of view about 
Japanese international economic policy formation has to be 
found in the rapidity with which Japan has been transformed 
from the status of small-to-middle ranking economic power to 
that of economic superpower. In the language of 
international economics, all the assumptions of the small 
country model have to be replaced by all the assumptions of 
the big country model, and that has significant implications 
for trade .and international economic policy strategy. Japan 
has been catapulted into a position of particular influence 
and responsibility in an extremely short time. Policy 
attitudes and institutions have had to adjust equally 
rapidly to this nev; circumstance. 
It will be clear already,that this transformation in policy 
philosophy has indeed taken place remarkably swiftly. But 
there are institutional lags. It will also be clear that 
very often the distortions of time and space make today's 
perceptions more a product of yesterday's than today's 
reality. 
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Yesterday, in the first two decades or so after the Second 
World War, Japan was a relatively small element in the world 
economy and trade. Under the umbrella of American political 
and economic power, paradoxically, it enjoyed a measure of 
foreign economic policy independence. The trade regime and 
other countries' trade systems were immutable in the 
formulation of its own approach to trade policy,70 and its 
own approach to trade policy was powerfully motivated by the 
need to promote exports in the face of an initially vastly 
overvalued yen.71 The policy nuance, if not the reality, 
was mercantilist. The transformation of Japan's economy and 
trade structure in the 1960s and the 1970s was accompanied 
by rapid trade and economic liberalisation, in pragmatic 
response largely, but not entirely, to United States 
pressuring and related international commitments. On many 
objective measures, Japan's liberalisation in this period 
was more rapid than that of Germany.72 In all of this, 
Japan played a role unambiguously supportive of American 
trade and broader diplomatic interests.73 
Today, Japan can no longer take the actions and policies of 
its partners as immutable to its own behaviour. Its scale 
and influence within world markets assign to it a prominent 
role in setting the parameters for stability in the global 
system.74 Policy philosophy is becoming attuned to this. 
In an historic development in July 1988, Japan delivered 
reform of its beef trade system consistently with the 
important GATT principles of 'transparency' and 'non-
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discrimination'.75 Japan is now committed to a staged 
reduction of protection on beef imports based on the removal 
of quantitative controls and the provision of global access 
under inducing tariffs. The systemic importance of this 
development is difficult to overestimate. It signals the 
extent to which broader strategic objectives are coming to 
discipline the pursuit of narrow sectional interests in the 
formulation of Japan's trade diplomacy (even in highly 
sensitive areas such as are involved in Japan's beef trade). 
The signs, in Japanese policy circles, are of vastly 
increased awareness of the need for this. Yet this 
discipline was obviously not generated entirely from within 
the Japanese policymaking -process. Indeed, Japan-targeting 
by the United States, coupled with active third-country 
Australian economic diplomacy, clearly helped Japanese 
policymakers deliver a policy outcome in this case which 
should help to strengthen the international trading system 
through the application of key GATT principles in an 
important sector of agricultural trade by a major trading 
nation. Ominously, in February 1989, Japan negotiated its 
first VER around the threat of dumping action against 
rapidly growing imports .of Korean knitwear. Against this 
action there was no cross-diplomatic buffer.76 Japan 
struggles with the problem of delivering real leadership in 
trade and economic diplomacy. 
Tomorrow, the assumption of trade and international economic 
policy leadership gives rise to expectations of a purposeful 
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and pro-active role for Japan in keeping the international 
trade and economic system together and open. 
While the economic basis for a more pro-active Japanese 
global trade policy role is gradually being established, the 
reactive character of Japanese foreign trade diplomacy 
remains remarkably pronounced. 
In 1986, in an essay for the Japanese journal Economics 
Today,77 I suggested that the Japanese political economy was 
best depicted as a reactive system for two important 
reasons. 
First, in response to the conflicts and pressures of rapid 
change in trade, industrial and social structure, there was 
a clear tendency in Japan to compensate for the costs of 
change in a mode not untypical of other industrial 
economies. In this conception, the picture of an interest-
group-dominated reactive political economy is rather 
different from the image projected by Johnson's idea of a 
strategically oriented 'development state'.78 The most 
notable example of compensating protection of tightly 
organised interests, of course, is in agriculture.79 Each 
conception may be relevant to a different era. Yet Miller80 
has shown in devastating detail that, in the hey-day of 
'industrial policy', the same was true for manufacturing. 
In this period too, protection was delivered to declining 
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industries (as in other industrial countries), not 
importantly to the fast growers. 
Second, Japanese policymakers were heavily influenced by 
foreign pressure, focused strongly on the American 
partnership and highly sensitised to American diplomatic, 
political and economic pressures.81 These two circumstances 
- the powerful interest group and bureaucratic inertia in 
Japanese policymaking processes that inhibits trade policy 
leadership, and the American satellite syndrome - are 
critical in judging Japan's capacity to assume a proper 
trade policy leadership role. 
Calder has recently undertaken a thorough-going and 
insightful analysis of Japan as a reactive state in the 
context of foreign economic policy formation.82 He 
observes correctly, in my view, that the reactive aspects of 
Japanese foreign economic policy behaviour are strongly 
entrenched, particularly 'considering the country's 
economic strength, the strategic inclinations of its 
technocracy, and the turbulent circumstance' it faces in the 
international economic ,. system.83 In his analysis, the 
reactive state also has two essential characteristics. The 
state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic 
policy initiatives when it has the power and national 
incentive to do so and it responds to outside pressures for 
change, although erratically, unsystematically and often 
incompletely. 
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Calder identifies two principal causes of the reactive 
nature of Japanese foreign economic policy: heavy 
dependence on the United States, rendered specially acute by 
Japan's resource vulnerabilities and diplomatic isolation; 
and the fragmented character of state authority in Japan, 
making decisive action more difficult than in countries with 
strong chief executives, such as the United States or 
France. Calder notes that the problem of domestic 
coordination is compounded in Japan by the lack of both a 
functionally-oriented administrative corps and authoritative 
codification of ministerial responsibilities to dampen 
bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction.84 Japan has, as 
van Wolferen puts it, 'a hierarchy, or a complex of 
overlapping hierachies without a top1,80 the intermittent 
attempts of figures such as former Prime Minister Nakasone 
to play a transcendent leadership role notwithstanding.86 
This feature of Japanese political process, I call 'the 
headless chook syndrome'.87 This is a vivid but apt 
metaphor, as any of Australian rural origin will readily 
understand. It is starkly evident in the current political 
circumstance in Japan.. It was less evident under the 
Nakasone administration, as Calder implies, with its more 
decisive resolution of conflicts over foreign economic 
policy in the Cabinet room. 
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T h i s b r i e f s y n o p s i s does n o t do j u s t i c e t o an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
r i c h l y i l l u s t r a t e d and s o p h i s t i c a t e d a n a l y s i s . But t h e main 
p o i n t s a r e c l e a r . 
C a l d e r d r a w s t h e i m p o r t a n t c o n c l u s i o n t h a t f o r e i g n 
p r e s s u r i n g must c o n t i n u e t o p l a y an i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e i n t h e 
f o r m u l a t i o n of J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c d i p l o m a c y . A 
c o r o l l a r y c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , i n t h e n e a r t e r m , t h e r e a c t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r of t h e J a p a n e s e s t a t e i n d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s h e l p s t o p r o l o n g t h e p e r i o d of U n i t e d S t a t e s hegenomy 
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and economic d i p l o m a c y . 8 8 A number 
of a u t h o r i t a t i v e J a p a n e s e c o m m e n t a t o r s s h a r e t h e same 
v i e w . 8 9 He c a u t i o n s , h o w e v e r , t h a t ' r e a c t i v e J a p a n e s e 
economic d ip lomacy and t h e i n t e n s i f y i n g f o r e i g n p r e s s u r e s 
t h a t m o t i v a t e i t , h a v e p o t e n t i a l l y f a t e f u l l o n g - r u n 
c o n s e q u e n c e s w i t h i n J a p a n . They a r e s t i m u l a t i n g 
n a t i o n a l i s m , a s J a p a n e s e p e o p l e become i n c r e a s i n g l y s u r e of 
t h e i r c o u n t r y ' s r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y and 
g l o b a l p rominence , j u s t a s t h e b a r r a g e of g l o b a l c r i t i c i s m 
a g a i n s t J a p a n i n t e n s i f i e s . The J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t 
c o n t i n u e s t o r e s p o n d t o most demands, w h i l e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t 
f o r such a c t i o n i s g rowing t h i n n e r ' . 9 0 
S h a r e d L e a d e r s h i p 
E c o n o m i c c h a n g e s i n t h e l a s t d e c a d e h a v e d r a m a t i c a l l y 
i n c r e a s e d t h e c a p a c i t y of J a p a n t o i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l sys tem and p l a y a more d e c i s i v e l e a d e r s h i p 
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role. The massive Japanese capital outflows in this period 
are one such change. In 1980, only 2 per cent of the 
production of Japanese corporations took place offshore, 
compared with 10 per cent for United States firms. Last 
year the proportion for Japan was over 5 per cent.91 The 
international reach and capacity of Japan's corporate 
community and Japanese society is making rapid strides. 
Yet Calder's analysis of foreign economic policy immobilism 
seems essentially correct and the condition is set to 
persist. Japan is no different from other modern industrial 
states in this respect. Japan faces much the same sort of 
problem delivering an international economic leadership as 
does the United States on fiscal adjustment or Europe on 
agricultural trade liberalisation. But, ironically, in view 
of many prevalent views of the authority of the Japanese 
state, there is a peculiar weakness in the constraining 
presence of government, in Japan, in resolving the 
inevitable domestic conflicts around the determination of 
foreign economic and trade policy approaches, precisely at a 
time when it is called for in large measure.92 Like other 
countries, even more so, Japan is porous to jostling on 
policy position, but the nature and American source of 
jostling will rapidly diminish its capacity to produce 
desired outcomes.93 
The external 'frame of reference' is an important element in 
policy formulation in any society, and perhaps especially 
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so, it seems, in Japan. A constructive approach is to 
recognise this characteristic in Japan's political 
circumstance and leadership style and to work purposefully 
to make a virtue of its necessity. Indeed, in the sharing 
of international economic leadership responsibilities, such 
as will be required as hegemonic dominance is no longer 
sustainable, such reticence could be a distinct advantage. 
My conclusion is not pessimistic. 
A key requirement, then, is redefinition of the framework 
within which foreign demands on Japan, and Japan's 
representation to its partners, can both be focused and 
qualified so as to make them more reasonable and digestible 
to both the Japanese and international polities alike. This 
interest has long been an important rationale behind efforts 
to develop broader dialogue on policy matters among the 
countries of the Pacific with which Japan has close 
relationships and to re-orient the United States-Japan 
partnership within that framework. The successful hosting, 
in Canberra last November, of the first Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial level meetings was a 
major step forward in this direction.94 
If Japan's adjustment to its leadership role in trade and 
economic diplomacy is difficult, American adjustment to the 
sharing of economic power and leadership responsibilities 
(not simply the bills and the burden) is no less so. 
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Two generations of Americans have ingrained perceptions 
founded on the United States' centrality to the 
international economy and its primacy in determining the 
major shifts in international capital and commodity markets. 
This is no longer the situation. The change is hard to 
adjust to, psychologically, institutionally and in terms of 
the domestic political debates. Acceptance of the 
diminution of economic power and acceptance of some of the 
rules which apply to smaller countries in ordering economic 
policy is new in America, even to the knowledgeable. And it 
is complicated by a political debate coloured with the 
perception that the adjustments required of Americans are, 
to complete the ironic circle, required solely at the 
dictates of Japan. 
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